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IT’S NOTHING 
PERSONAL
Kelly Ross
Impersonality: Seven Essays by 
Sharon Cameron. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
Pp. 272. $65.00 cloth. $25.00 paper.
In everyday usage, “impersonality” 
denotes an absence of personality, 
often fi gured as a machinelike or 
robotic manner, such as the imper-
sonality of customer service call-
center operators. It also refers to 
something that is not particular-
ized, not connected to specifi c indi-
viduals but dispersed more gener-
ally, suggesting disinterestedness. 
The Oxford English Dictionary em-
phasizes this set of meanings, which 
describes a person who is not acting 
like a person. In Impersonality, on 
the other hand, Sharon Cameron 
presses hard on the texts under 
examination to elucidate another, 
more radical sense of the word. In 
each of the seven essays, imperson-
ality denotes not just a person who 
is not acting like a person, but the 
erasure of the “personal”: the effort 
to eradicate persons entirely. For 
most of the authors in this study, the 
payoff of such effort is enlighten-
ment, variously defi ned. Radical 
impersonality shares features with 
the nonhuman and the inanimate, 
but as Cameron is continually at 
pains to demonstrate, the boundar-
ies between these categories become 
themselves unstable and permeable. 
Once one takes seriously the con-
cept of “impersonality” as more 
than just a descriptive term for ab-
normal behavior and makes it an 
end in itself, it ruptures all other 
categories that depend on the stabil-
ity of the personal.
This essay collection is undeni-
ably challenging, but it amply re-
wards the reader’s investment. 
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Cameron’s close readings are stun-
ning in their precision and penetra-
tion. Moreover, her consideration 
of the ethical stakes of the texts is 
exemplary, as she strikes a careful 
balance between generous reading 
and conscientious interrogation. Each 
essay focuses on one author: Wil-
liam Empson, Jonathan Edwards, 
Ralph Waldo Emerson (who is the 
subject of two essays), Simone 
Weil, T. S. Eliot, and Herman Mel-
ville. Although there are resonances 
among these authors’ representa-
tions of impersonality, each formu-
lates it differently, and each has a 
different view of whether and 
how it can be achieved. Cameron’s 
analysis of these multifarious under-
standings has broad-ranging impli-
cations, particularly for the study of 
nineteenth-century American lit-
erature. While reading the book, 
additional authors leaped to mind—
Emily Dickinson, Edgar Allan Poe, 
Frederick Douglass—whose texts 
would complement or complicate 
Cameron’s analysis.
Impersonality is a departure from 
Cameron’s earlier monographs on 
nineteenth-century American au-
thors such as Dickinson, Melville, 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, Henry Tho-
reau, and Henry James. In those 
studies, Cameron limited her data 
set to a single author—or a pair, in the 
case of Melville and Hawthorne—in 
order to anchor her investigations 
of such vast and abstract concepts as 
“time” and “thinking.” This circum-
scription resulted in a deep, thor-
ough, complex engagement with 
her material. Treating a similarly 
vast concept in the new book, Cam-
eron comes at it obliquely and par-
tially, treating a range of authors 
from different times and places. It is 
not a tradeoff between depth and 
superfi ciality, certainly, as Cameron 
is as rigorous and nuanced as ever. 
Yet the collection lacks the synthesis 
that characterizes Cameron’s pre-
vious book-length studies. Cam-
eron repeatedly acknowledges this 
difference in her preface, calling her 
essays “provisional” (xvii) and con-
ceding that the various genres of the 
texts “invite different kinds of con-
sideration” (xv). Rather than taking 
that insight as a prompt to a system-
atic approach that contemplates the 
limits or conditions that genre places 
on representations of impersonality, 
Cameron uses it to excuse herself 
from comparative analysis of the 
authors at hand. This lack of an 
overarching argument is merely a 
disappointment, given the impres-
sive powers of synthesis on display 
in Cameron’s earlier work, but the 
lack of refl ection on exclusions that 
her selection criteria permit is a more 
serious weakness, one to which I 
shall return.
Chapter 1, which also serves as 
an introduction, treats Empson’s 
fascination with the asymmetrical 
faces of Buddha statues. Empson 
argued that Buddha faces recon-
ciled seemingly incompatible oppo-
sites, such as “complete repose” and 
“an active power to help the wor-
shipper,” by separating these attri-
butes onto either side of the face. 
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Cameron contrasts Empson’s posi-
tive view that impersonality can arise 
from a unity of contradictions with 
the recognition articulated by the 
other fi ve authors she treats, each of 
whom dwells on the costs of imper-
sonality. There is no sense of vio-
lence or loss in the achievement of 
impersonality in Buddha faces; af-
ter all, Empson is analyzing images 
of a divine being, not a person. This 
counterexample underscores the 
pathos embedded in the writing 
Cameron examines in the remain-
der of the book, as persons struggle 
with the fact that “impersonality (as 
a practice, as an ethic, as a repre-
sentation), since it is undertaken by 
persons, could only be contradictory 
by defi nition” (7). This contradic-
tion takes a toll on persons who 
“surrender” to “a force that effaces 
what individuates them” (12); speci-
fying the effects of that toll on vari-
ous authors is Cameron’s aim in the 
following six essays.
In chapter 2 Cameron argues 
that Edwards differs from Empson, 
Emerson, Weil, and Eliot (Melville 
is a special case) in rejecting the 
possibility that persons can achieve 
impersonality—even fl eetingly and 
as a result of rigorous training. Ed-
wards’s last work, The Nature of 
True Virtue, closes off this possibil-
ity, which had remained open in his 
earlier works. For Edwards, “true 
virtue” consists in ideal love, in which 
one loves things impartially accord-
ing to the degree of being they pos-
sess, rather than according to their 
relationship to oneself. Cameron 
claims that Edwards makes this 
impersonal love, which is intuitive 
for God, categorically impossible 
for persons because it would al-
ways be based on calculations per-
formed within a self-interested 
frame of reference.
The fi rst of two essays on Emer-
son is a brilliant reading of “Experi-
ence,” yet it is only tangentially 
related to impersonality. Cameron 
argues that “Experience” enacts the 
recognition that a particularized, 
individual experience (grief at the 
death of a son) is equivalent to all 
experience, and that both are de-
fi ned by dissociation. Emerson re-
sists this impersonal grief by refusing 
to mourn Waldo, his son, directly; 
instead, he pushes his personal grief 
over Waldo’s death to the margins 
of the essay so as to “preserve what 
is dismissed from anything that 
might threaten it—specifi cally . . . 
to empower the grief that the essay 
has marginalized” (78). The “tri-
umph” (78) of the personal over the 
impersonal in this essay is at odds 
with the overwhelming force of the 
impersonal in the other essays in 
Cameron’s collection.
Cameron argues in chapter 4 that 
Emerson’s essays dramatize the 
transformation of the personal into 
the impersonal, a transformation 
that Emerson calls “ravishment.” 
In most of his essays, Emerson con-
structs an impersonal voice that 
lacks embodiment or individuality, 
whose source is unrecognizable, and 
whose contradictory propositions 
preclude summary. “The Poet” is a 
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telling exception because ravishment 
does not occur; the person who calls 
the poet into existence is visible as a 
person and does not transform into 
the poet, who would be impersonal. 
“The Poet” is thus a productive fail-
ure for Cameron, since it illumi-
nates the problem at the core of the 
other essays, a problem critics have 
previously formulated in terms of 
Emerson’s ethical failure. While 
ravishment, in its dual meaning of 
violation and rapture, implies an 
intense mixture of pain and pleasure 
at the moment of transformation, 
the impersonal voice represents only 
the nondifferentiated serenity that 
follows the annihilation of the per-
son. Since there is never a person—
except in “The Poet”—for the 
ravishment to happen to, there is 
never a convincing representation 
of that ravishment, which is ostensi-
bly the goal of the essays. The im-
personal voice, with its utter lack of 
ambivalence about the destruction 
of the person, cannot speak for any 
person, and thus, ultimately, cannot 
speak to any person.
In contrast to Emerson’s disre-
gard for the costs of impersonality, 
Weil was minutely aware of the vi-
olence that self-annihilation exacts 
on the person. In chapter 5 Cam-
eron elaborates Weil’s theory that 
attention constitutes real being. At-
tention is a practice that strips away 
the illusions of will, personal point 
of view, motive, even basic discrimi-
nation, until being becomes simply 
interminable waiting, without ob-
ject and without hope. In the latter 
part of the essay, Cameron meditates 
on Weil’s death from starvation, 
positing that the extremity of Weil’s 
commitment to attention seems to 
necessitate a commitment to death. 
The sixth chapter, on Eliot’s Four 
Quartets, also centers on the repre-
sentation of death, but Eliot blurs 
the line between the living and the 
dead. This effacement of distinction 
permeates the entire poem, eroding 
any sense of individual identity. Re-
turning to the Buddhist doctrine 
that being is momentary, not con-
tinuous, Cameron argues that Eliot 
extends this insight to experience. 
Making “experience” independent 
of “persons who experience,” Eliot 
depicts phenomena as unbound and 
mobile.
The fi nal chapter, on Melville’s 
Billy Budd, is the clearest and most 
systematic account of impersonality 
in the collection. This clarity might 
derive from the fact that Cameron’s 
analysis here focuses on fi ctional 
character, already a category not 
equivalent to person, whereas else-
where in the collection she examines 
examples of genres—essays, note-
books, and lyric poetry—that are 
traditionally presumed to give access 
to an authorial subjectivity. First, 
Cameron shows how characters 
who seem to be opposites, such as 
Claggart and Billy, reveal that dif-
ferentiation cannot be sustained, 
thus destabilizing the very concept 
of character. More radically, Cam-
eron demonstrates that characters 
share features with entities in the 
non-characterological realm, such 
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as light and stones. This latter insight 
collapses any distinction between 
persons and other phenomena. The 
violence of this version of imper-
sonality is not legible on the surface 
of the writing, in Melville’s elegant, 
seductive prose, but rather in the 
shocking imperative Melville places 
on his reader to accept the radical 
erasure of categories without the 
promise of any consolatory enlight-
enment.
While most of the authors in-
cluded in Impersonality are Ameri-
can, traditional organizing rubrics 
of geography and time period are 
incidental to Cameron, who instead 
emphasizes a qualitative component 
to her principle of inclusion. She 
chose to study these six authors be-
cause of the “uncompromising na-
ture of [their] writing” (viii), the 
“intensity of their engagement with 
this topic” (vii), and their “resistance 
to impersonality” (xvi). The value 
system encoded in those descriptors—
uncompromising, intense, resistant—
reveals a problem with the collection. 
Cameron’s narrow focus on au-
thors whose main concerns are 
spiritual or philosophical excludes 
instantiations of impersonality that 
might complicate her emphasis on 
the individual. Although Cameron 
occasionally raises issues of the so-
cial, her selection criteria have ex-
cluded, almost by defi nition, writers 
who negotiate the compromises 
necessary for the social world. More-
over, Cameron does not engage 
with the sense of impersonality 
that arises in relation to masses of 
persons—the impersonality of the 
mob, for example. This omission is 
all the more surprising given her 
stress on violence; the impersonal 
mob’s proclivity to violence in Poe’s 
or Baudelaire’s imaginations liter-
alizes the metaphorical violence 
that Cameron elucidates in Ed-
wards or Emerson. These counter-
examples invert the representations 
of impersonality that Cameron 
traces, as Poe, for example, por-
trays the submission of individual 
will to mob rule as pleasurable (in a 
brutish, sensual way) and sponta-
neous rather than an arduous sac-
rifi ce requiring extensive training.
Further, while Cameron treats 
bondage and freedom as religious 
concepts in her essay on Weil, she 
never addresses the material real-
ity of chattel slavery in the United 
States. Although the texts Cam-
eron discusses celebrate the perme-
ability of the boundary between 
human and nonhuman as a source 
of philosophical and intellectual 
pleasure, sometimes even as an idea 
that promises an end to personal 
suffering, many slave narratives 
worked to reinscribe those divi-
sions and to reject proslavery ide-
ologies that would blur the 
distinction between enslaved per-
sons and animals. The “resistance” 
Cameron observes in her authors—
their recognition that, to a person, 
impersonality feels like a loss—
pales in comparison to the urgency 
of Douglass’s resistance, for exam-
ple. Joan Dayan and Maurice Lee, 
whose work overlaps with many 
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of Cameron’s concerns, offer ex-
amples of a more historically 
grounded philosophical criticism, 
attuned to the social ramifi cations 
of abstractions. Eschewing a con-
clusion to the disparate essays, 
Cameron never refl ects on her de-
cision to include only privileged 
authors who are free to contem-
plate and practice the types of radi-
cal impersonality that, whatever 
their psychic cost, nevertheless are 
sought by the practitioner.
—University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill
